Containment of COVID-19 outbreak at a veterans affairs community living center.

Asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic staff and residents likely contribute to widespread transmission of COVID-19 in long-term care settings. Here, we describe the successful containment of a COVID-19 outbreak on one floor of a 163-bed Veterans Affairs (VA) Community Living Center (CLC). Testing using nasopharyngeal swabs with a rapid turn-around-time identified 3 of 28 (11%) residents and 2 of 41 (5%) healthcare personnel (HCP) with COVID-19. Both HCP likely worked on the floor while pre-symptomatic. When one HCP reported a cough to the secondary (employee) screening clinic, she was erroneously advised to work. Protocols to limit the risk for HCP to import COVID-19 were reinforced with Community Living Center staff as well as with personnel in secondary screening. Further, the CLC implemented an expanded screening tool that assessed residents for typical and atypical symptoms of COVID-19. No further cases of COVID-19 were detected on the CLC floor in the subsequent 6 weeks. Swift recognition and response helped contain the outbreak and prevent further COVID-19 infections among other residents and staff.

Containment of COVID-19 outbreak at a veterans affairs community living center

Asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic staff and residents likely contribute to widespread transmission of COVID-19 in long-term care settings. Here, we describe the successful containment of a COVID-19 outbreak on one floor of a 163-bed Veterans Affairs (VA) Community Living Center (CLC). Testing using nasopharyngeal swabs with a rapid turn-around-time identified 3 of 28 (11%) residents and 2 of 41 (5%) healthcare personnel (HCP) with COVID-19. Both HCP likely worked on the floor while pre-symptomatic. When one HCP reported a cough to the secondary (employee) screening clinic, she was erroneously advised to work. Protocols to limit the risk for HCP to import COVID-19 were reinforced with Community Living Center staff as well as with personnel in secondary screening. Further, the CLC implemented an expanded screening tool that assessed residents for typical and atypical symptoms of COVID-19. No further cases of COVID-19 were detected on the CLC floor in the subsequent 6 weeks. Swift recognition and response helped contain the outbreak and prevent further COVID-19 infections among other residents and staff.

Investigation of a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in a hospital administration building.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in employees working on 1 floor of a hospital administration building. METHODS: Contact tracing was performed to identify potential exposures and all employees were tested for SARS-CoV-2. Whole-genome sequencing was performed to determine the relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 samples from infected personnel and from control cases in the healthcare system with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) during the same period. Carbon dioxide levels were measured during a workday to assess adequacy of ventilation; readings >800 parts per million (ppm) were considered an indication of suboptimal ventilation. To assess the potential for airborne transmission, DNA-barcoded aerosols were released, and real-time polymerase chain reaction was used to quantify particles recovered from air samples in multiple locations. RESULTS: Between December 22, 2020, and January 8, 2021, 17 coworkers tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, including 13 symptomatic and 4 asymptomatic individuals. Of the 5 cluster SARS-CoV-2 samples sequenced, 3 were genetically related, but these employees denied higher-risk contacts with one another. None of the sequences from the cluster were genetically related to the 17 control sequences of SARS-CoV-2. Carbon dioxide levels increased during a workday but never exceeded 800 ppm. DNA-barcoded aerosol particles were dispersed from the sites of release to locations throughout the floor; 20% of air samples had >1 log10 particles. CONCLUSIONS: In a hospital administration building outbreak, sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 confirmed transmission among coworkers. Transmission occurred despite the absence of higher-risk exposures and in a setting with adequate ventilation based on monitoring of carbon dioxide levels.

Airflow patterns in double occupancy patient rooms may contribute to roommate-to-roommate transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.

BACKGROUND: Hospitalized patients are at risk to acquire severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from roommates with unrecognized coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). We hypothesized that airflow patterns might contribute to SARS-CoV-2 transmission in double occupancy patient rooms. METHODS: A device emitting condensed moisture was used to identify airflow patterns in double occupancy patient rooms. Simulations were conducted to assess transfer of fluorescent microspheres, 5% sodium chloride aerosol, and aerosolized bacteriophage MS2 between patient beds 3 meters apart and to assess the effectiveness of privacy curtains and portable air cleaners in reducing transfer. RESULTS: Air flowed from inlet vents in the center of the room to an outlet vent near the door, resulting in air currents flowing toward the bed adjacent to the outlet vent. Fluorescent microspheres (212-250 µm diameter), 5% sodium chloride aerosol, and aerosolized bacteriophage MS2 released from the inner bed were carried on air currents toward the bed adjacent to the outlet vent. Closing curtains between the patient beds reduced transfer of each of the particles. Operation of a portable air cleaner reduced aerosol transfer to the bed adjacent to the outlet vent but did not offer a benefit over closing the curtains alone, and in some situations resulted in an increase in aerosol exposure. CONCLUSION: Airflow patterns in double occupancy patient rooms may contribute to risk for transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between roommates. Keeping curtains closed between beds may be beneficial in reducing risk.

Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in a Patient Transport Van.

We report 2 episodes of potential SARS-CoV-2 transmission from infected van drivers to passengers despite masking and physical distancing. Whole-genome sequencing confirmed relatedness of driver and passenger SARS-CoV-2. With the heater operating, fluorescent microspheres were transported by airflow >3 meters from the front to the back of the van.

Use of carbon dioxide measurements to assess ventilation in an acute care hospital.

Poorly ventilated indoor spaces pose a risk for airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2. We measured carbon dioxide levels in a multiple areas in an acute care hospital to assess the adequacy of ventilation. Carbon dioxide levels remained below 800 parts per million in most areas but exceeded this level in a small conference room with 8 occupants, an office with 3 occupants, and a bathroom with 2 occupants. Measuring carbon dioxide levels could provide a simple means for healthcare facilities to assess the adequacy of ventilation.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Inpatient and Outpatient Settings in a Veterans Affairs Health Care System.

BACKGROUND: Health care personnel and patients are at risk to acquire severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in health care settings, including in outpatient clinics and ancillary care areas. METHODS: Between May 1, 2020, and January 31, 2021, we identified clusters of 3 or more coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases in which nosocomial transmission was suspected in a Veterans Affairs health care system. Asymptomatic employees and patients were tested for SARS-CoV-2 if they were identified as being at risk through contact tracing investigations; for 7 clusters, all personnel and/or patients in a shared work area were tested regardless of exposure history. Whole-genome sequencing was performed to determine the relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 samples from the clusters and from control employees and patients. RESULTS: Of 14 clusters investigated, 7 occurred in community-based outpatient clinics, 1 in the emergency department, 3 in ancillary care areas, and 3 on hospital medical/surgical wards that did not provide care for patients with known COVID-19 infection. Eighty-one of 82 (99%) symptomatic COVID-19 cases and 31 of 35 (89%) asymptomatic cases occurred in health care personnel. Sequencing analysis provided support for several transmission events between coworkers and in 2 cases supported transmission from health care personnel to patients. There were no documented transmissions from patients to personnel. CONCLUSIONS: Clusters of COVID-19 with nosocomial transmission predominantly involved health care personnel and often occurred in outpatient clinics and ancillary care areas. There is a need for improved measures to prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by health care personnel in inpatient and outpatient settings.

Use of whole-genome sequencing to investigate a cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections in emergency department personnel.

Several recent reports have raised concern that infected coworkers may be an important source of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) acquisition by healthcare personnel. In a suspected outbreak among emergency department personnel, sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 confirmed transmission among coworkers. The suspected 6-person outbreak included 2 distinct transmission clusters and 1 unrelated infection.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid contamination of surfaces on a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) ward and intensive care unit.

On coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) wards, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) nucleic acid was frequently detected on high-touch surfaces, floors, and socks inside patient rooms. Contamination of floors and shoes was common outside patient rooms on the COVID-19 wards but decreased after improvements in floor cleaning and disinfection were implemented.

What are the sources of exposure in healthcare personnel with coronavirus disease 2019 infection?

In our facility, 25% of personnel with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) had a higher-risk exposure to an infected patient or co-worker and 14% reported a higher-risk exposure in the community. All higher-risk exposures to infected patients occurred on non-COVID-19 units, often when there was a delay in diagnosis because COVID-19 was not initially suspected. Higher-risk exposures to co-workers with COVID-19 often involved lapses in compliance with masking in nonpatient care areas such as nursing stations and staff work or break rooms.